Before the Commission on Elections (Comelec) moves into the next stage of its mandate which is the process where candidacies are filed and accepted for posting on the electoral ballot for the 2010 elections, it must pause and seriously review how the automation of the election will proceed.
It is true that the Comelec has bidded out and chosen the supplier of equipment and the method of electronic counting. It is also true that the supplier has confidently said that all systems are go and the end result will be a smooth and timely counting of the votes that will result in definite nationwide election results within three to five days, or even earlier. It is also true that the Comelec official designated to explain the intricacies of the process including the software security, speedy counting and canvassing, has confidently said that there will be no problems that cannot be solved satisfactorily using the automation technology that the Comelec has selected. In other words, those credible, accurate and timely results will be the end product of full automation of the election process.
Yet knowledgeable and experienced computer and systems experts are not so sure and in fact, are becoming increasingly nervous about the precipitate automation programmed for nationwide coverage. There has not been enough testing to remove the glitches that can occur in the upcoming Philippine elections which by themselves are a gargantuan, unique and consuming process. It must also be mentioned that the accompanying software is particularly worrisome at this point for the vagueness about its security, a suspect part because of the possibility of manipulation by those who would have ill intentions.
This unease on the part of experts may annoy the Comelec for revisiting what they feel they have moved forward from with the choice of the supplier and the method for automation. But complex Philippine electoral conditions are like nowhere else. The names on our ballots can get to the hundreds, the ballot paper itself will be 20 inches long, the inexperience of the ordinary voter in the non-traditional intricacies of choosing from so many names using special writing or marking implements, machines that will have to process long pieces of paper without jamming and other unknowns (for not having tested the machines extensively enough or given the voters the necessary trial exercises) are fraught with perils of glitches.
The cry and compulsion for modernization of our elections come from the delays in the results which allow for cheating. The cheating occurs far from the precinct level where the votes are cast, but in the distant realm of the canvassing. At this level, it is not penny ante dishonesty but wholesale manipulation of large sums. From past elections, the electorate knows that the cheating here can reverse the will of the electorate as evidenced by the discrepancy of results counted on the precinct level compared to the purported canvassing results. It has been pointed out time and time again to the Comelec that on the precinct level, there is little opportunity for cheating for the many witnesses present during the manual counting. The watchers of candidates, the voters of the precinct, the nongovernment organizations, the election watchdogs, the media, are all present in full force here during the tabulation. In such an open and witnessed manual counting which may take time, but not inordinately (not days but hours at most) cheating is quickly detected and sanctioned. It is true that precinct level cheating can occur in some places where warlords rule and the public is not allowed to witness the counting, but that becomes obvious and therefore discredited ab initio. Again, we reiterate as public opinion knows, it is in the canvassing where massive cheating takes place, with the large numbers that it deals with, enough to result in reversals of precinct level results. Here is where fail safe automation should be first used.
Thus, time and again knowledgeable quarters have requested the Comelec to go slower on the other stages of automation and concentrate first on the canvassing process. There may be some glitches which will have to be addressed there and then. But if that is the first and limited stage of initial automation, the Comelec and its suppliers can deal with it without having to address other glitches at other levels, a possibility that arises from automation of all stages of the electoral process. It need not be said that the security of the software for the canvassing must be above suspicion so that credible and acceptable results emerge. At this point it has to be proven to the public that it is so and identify to responsible quarters the people who will ensure its ultimate security, neutrality and credibility so that the public can be free from doubt. Responsibility must be pinpointed and accepted.
The latest group that has raised its voice to the Comelec to review the automation process and go less precipitately on the automation by modernizing solely the canvassing at first is the Former Senior Government Officials Association in a letter expressing their discomfort and worries about sudden, untested widespread automation. Comelec should take their stand seriously and dialogue with them for the purpose of addressing their concerns. While it is true that the election automation law authorizes the Comelec to fully automate the election process, Comelec must also seriously consider the provision in the law that mandates it to choose the “most appropriate” technology in the automation process. The gradual step-by-step way is again recommended by those who have the knowledge and experience as the least dangerous under the circumstances. Right now experts who know the requirements of Philippine elections (multiple names and choices, millions of inexperienced machine voters, underpowered precincts, inadequately trained and untested precinct level staff for automation, new and by far also inadequately tested machines) fear there are too many perils and occasions for glitches when automation is precipitately applied at all levels. Worst-case scenarios must always be taken seriously and analyzed closely to come up with solutions in instances of going into new territory. If automation is rashly put in place, worst-case scenarios can become realities which will mean errors, disorder, panic, chaos. No need to elaborate how this can spread to the entire system. Any and all of these can cause an anarchic situation that will lead to a worse, not a better way of running elections.
Comelec must listen once more to outside neutral experts. Since the machines have not as yet been delivered, it can still hold the order, perhaps for the next elections after extensive testing and training of the voters on their use, and meantime concentrate only on the canvassing of votes. For its own better management and confidence, it must study all the facts and adjust to them, accepting that those who wish to help, do so because all of us have a stake in the electoral process and would like it to be credible and efficient. We plead for Comelec to have an open mind and open itself to review its automation plans one more time.
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